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Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense
that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by
imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences
are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects
are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, this plays no role in determining bargaining
behaviour. To the contrary, when the bargaining game is played in conventional experimental
setting with monetary cost of delay, these do have an impact on subjects’ conduct in negotiations.
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1 1 1 1  Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The role that time plays in economic decisions and behaviour is paramount, and has long been
recognised. The literature is huge
1, dating back at least to the 17
th century, and models of
intertemporal allocation of resources are the staple diet for undergraduate students in economics.
However, actual behaviour is often at odds with conventional economic wisdom
2.
We all shop around for the lower mortgage rate or the highest savings rate, but when the
transaction is not purely financial behaviour seems less ‘rational’. For instance, in the real estate
market, there is evidence
3 that we tend to stay focused on achieving the maximum possible price,
and only a small proportion of house sellers does revise the asking price downwards, in spite of the
obvious trade-off between sale price and time on the market.
More generally, casual evidence would suggest that when people are involved in a task where
time is not the only relevant dimension, its effect may be somewhat “watered down”
4. My objective
in this paper is to test this hypothesis. The specific task I consider is a bargaining situation, so as
to study whether or not bargaining over time incorporates peculiar features which cannot be
accounted for by traditional experimental design.
My results indicate that, although when involved in a task which involves purely time subjects
do ‘react’ to it, when the principal task is such that time is only one of the relevant features
involved, it seems not to matter. I will refer to this as time prominence (or lack of it).
The reason why I look at a bargaining task is that time preferences (i.e. impatience) are
considered as one of the fundamental forces driving the outcome in non-cooperative models of
bargaining
5. This feature is translated in experimental settings by modelling the agents' preference
for an earlier (rather than a delayed) agreement by means of an exogenous reduction of the surplus
bargained over every time disagreement occurs. So if, say, subjects are negotiating over the division
of a surplus between them, the experimenter can impose a rate of time preferences τ i on player i,
                                       
1 For choices among ‘single’ time dependent outcomes Fishburn and Rubinstein (1980) provide
representation theorems for utility maximising agent with a monotonic and continuous preference ordering on
X× T (where X is the set of outcomes and T is the set of times). Meyer (1976) considers the case of
preferences over sequences of time dependent outcomes, as more recently Fishburn and Edwards (1997). See
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue  (2001) for a thorough review of these issues.
2 The stark contrast between actual behaviour and the theoretical conjecture on Homo Oeconomicus’
conduct  are commanding more and more the attention of the professionals. See for instance Thaler (1991),
Elster (1998), Rabin (1998), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Rabin, Goeree and Holt (2000), Starmer (2000),
Henrich et al. (2001) and Loewenstein (2001) to cite just a few.
3 Ortalo-Magné and Merlo (2000) find that only about 25% of house sellers in England lower the selling
price (after an average of 11 weeks on the market). Anglin et al (2001) finds a higher proportion for Canada
(around 46%).
4 The fact that “distractors” worsen task performance is well reserached in the cognitive neurosciences.
For instance, interference (from subsequent terms in a list of numbers) impairs short term memory (see
Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangum (1998), chapter 7, and references therein), and time preferences are
dramatically affected by addiction (see for instance Bickel and Marsch, 2001).
5 Theoretical non-cooperative bargaining models with an alternating offers structure and proportional
discounting have proven somewhat more popular than those with fixed costs of delay; even more so in the3








) by having the surplus reduced by a
factor
6  δ i at every round following disagreement (so that subject i’s share xi is worth δ ixi if
agreement is reached at time t). Whether or not this is a legitimate way to render time preferences
in a laboratory environment is then crucial for the interpretation of the experimental results.
 The development of theoretical tools for analysing non cooperative bargaining and its relevance
for real life have happily conjured to favour the flourishing of a rich literature on experimental
models of bargaining over “shrinking” pies
7. But all these experiments share the problem that they
try and implement the theoretical  framework of bargaining over time in experimental settings
where on the contrary time has no role at all. What these experiments really study is therefore the
extent to which backward induction type of reasoning is “used”, if at all, by subjects in
negotiations
8.
In this paper I therefore consider alongside “conventional” experimental settings - where time is
modelled as some cost to be incurred in case of failure to reach immediate agreement - a bargaining
game where disagreement entails receiving the agreed share at a later point in time. In order to
make the “conventional” and “real time” comparable, real time bargaining is preceded by a stage
in which the subjects’ time preferences are assessed.
There is a problem, though, with addressing the issue of time preferences directly, as the debate
on how actual time preferences should be modelled is still as open as it is unsettled. A number of
violations of representations of time preference of the form outlined above have been noted
9. Often
“dread”'' and “savouring” effects'' are observed
10, which refer to the fact that people prefer to
postpone a pleasant activity (so as to enjoy also the “build up”'to it), or to anticipate an
                                                                                                                              
experimental bargaining literature. For a review of the huge literature sparked by Rubinstein (1982), see for
instance Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992).
6 Such discount factor can be imposed to be the same for both players (as for instance in Binmore, Shaked
and Sutton (1985), Guth and Tietz (1988) , Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel, 1988), or different (as in Ochs
and Roth, 1989).
7 See Roth (1995) for a thorough survey of this vast literature; Rapoport ET AL consider alternating
offers bargaining models where the cost of delay is some fixed constant.
8 The debate has initially focused on checking the accuracy of subgame perfect equilibrium as a predictor
of the outcome of experimental negotiations. Failing that, the next step has been to trying and individuate
possible heuristics used by experimental subjects. The evidence on this is somewhat mixed (see e.g. Prasnikar
and Roth (1992), who investigate off the equilibrium path incentives to players to conform to behaviour
which is subgame perfect in both ultimatum and “best shot” games.), and it is not uncommon to observe
subjects reject an offer and make a counter-proposal that leaves them with a smaller payoff than the one
previously rejected. Thus, there might be fairness considerations lurking in the background, which may
trigger rejection of an ‘insultingly low’ offer. This in turn poses the problem of detecting what sort of
agreements people deem fair; on this, see for instance Binmore, Morgan, Shaked and Sutton (1991). However,
see also Forsythe et al. (1994) for an example where bargaining power is totally exploited in the absence of
punishment. Other studies of fairness are for instance Bolton and Ockenfels (2001) and Fehr and Gachter
(2000).
9 For a survey of these violations, see Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) or Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
For a thorough treatment of issues concerning choice over time see Elster and Loewenstein (1992) and more
recently Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue  (2001).
10 Results of this kind have been obtained for instance by Loewenstein (1987).4
unpleasant task (so as to avoid contemplating this unfavourable outcome for too long).
Furthermore, observed preferences are rarely stationary, and people often exhibit a strict
preference for immediacy: they may be indifferent between some immediate outcome and a delayed
one, but in case they are both brought forward in time, the immediate outcome loses completely its
attractiveness
11. Besides, there is an abundance of papers which argue that discounting behaviour is
more consistent with hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting
12.
In this paper I take an agnostic view on the competing theories on time preferences, and do not
fully investigate alternative possible representations. As it will become clear further below, for my
purposes it is not necessary to estimate discount factors
13 precisely. It is enough for me to be able
to establish that subjects are indeed sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward by some form of
(incentive compatible) measure of time attitude. Then, I will be able to show that the experimental
designs conventionally adopted for bargaining games fail to approximate negotiations over time-
dependent outcomes, where bargaining behaviour is totally unaffected by the cost of delay.
The experimental design for this paper is described in the next section. Section 3 overviews the
results, which are discussed in detail in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 2 2 2  Experimental design Experimental design Experimental design Experimental design
The experiment was conducted over two consecutive days (during term time) at the Economics
Department of LUISS University in Rome. The subjects were first year undergraduates with no
prior exposition to Game Theory.
Three treatments were considered. The first one consisted of two stages. In the first stage time
preferences (over delays of one and two months) were elicited by using a modification of the
Becker-Marschack-De Groot procedure
14, hence this treatment is referred to as BDM. In the second
stage subjects played a two round bargaining game on the division of a sum of money (300
monetary units
15). The other two treatments consisted of the second stage only (bargaining).  As
explained more in detail below, in the BDM treatment delayed agreement (i.e. agreement in the
second round) resulted in subjects receiving their payment with a time lag of one month. For the
other two treatments, agreement in the second round entailed either a payment of a fixed fee (out
                                       
11 This phenomenon is reminiscent of violations of expected utility theory. For instance, Burgos, Grant
and  Kajii (1997) model an alternating offers bargaining model where agents' preferences exhibit a certainty
effect (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) present a treatment of choice over
time and under risk from a unifying'' perspective.
12 Hyperbolic discount functions imply that discount rates decrease over time. For evidence documenting
this phenomenon, consult for instance Ainslie (1975), Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989), Laibson (1997),
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and Thaler (1981). On the contrary, other papers have argued that hyperbolic
discounting does not accurately describe time preference (e.g. Rubinstein, 2000 and Frederick, Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue, 2001).
13 For a thorough review of papers measuring discount factors see Frederick, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue  (2001).
14 See Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964), or Bohm, Linden and Sonnegard (1997).5
of the share of the surplus) in the FIXED treatment (henceforth FXD), or a fall in the value of the
chips bargained over in the DISCOUNT treatment (henceforth DSC).
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM)
In the first stage subjects’ preferences were elicited by a modification of the Becker-De Groot-
Marschak procedure, where a good is substituted for a “bad” (waiting). More precisely, each of the
40 subject was told that by participating in the experiment s/he was entitled to collect a prize of
300 monetary units, which however would have to be collected with a delay of X months. They
were then asked to write down on special forms the amount of money (limit price) LP they would
be willing to pay in order to avoid having to wait X months to collect their entitlement. The forms
were then collected and the declared limit price was compared with a randomly
16 determined
asking price. If the latter was lower than the named pay price, then the subject would receive the
payment net of the random asking price the next day
17; if instead the asking price was equal or
greater than the declared limit price, the subjects would receive the full sum with one day and X
months and one day delay.
In order to test the constancy of time preferences, subjects were asked to declare two limit
prices, one for a delay X=1 month and one with delay X=2 months; consequently, two (possibly
distinct) asking prices (one for each version) were drawn. In the end one for the two versions (one
or two months) was randomly selected, and payment proceeded accordingly.
As with the usual BDM, here too the dominant strategy for the subjects is to state the true
reservation price: the incentive to bid a low price is offset by the fact that the lower the limit price,
the less likely it is that the asking price is even lower, resulting in the delayed collection of the
prize. Thus, it was possible to measure the subjects' monetary evaluation of the time unit X.
Subjects then were told that the first stage of the experiment was over, and that they would
now have to negotiate with an anonymous opponent to share some money (additional 300
monetary units). In the bargaining stage negotiations proceeded over two rounds, with the role of
first proposer (Bargainer East) and first responder (Bargainer West) assigned randomly, and with
subjects of each type sitting in separate rooms.
In order to exchange proposals subjects had to fill in a paper bargaining form (see appendix)
which was carried between rooms by an assistant. Each form reported for each of the two
bargainers the one month limit price elicited in the first stage.
                                                                                                                              
15 Each monetary unit corresponded to 100 Italian Liras (ITL), which at the time (May 2000)
corresponded to about 30 British Pence roughly.
16 The asking price was determined by randomly drawing three table tennis balls, one for each digit of the
asking price, from three bags, the first of which contained three balls only numbered 0 to 2 (first digit of the
asking price) and the other two containing 10 balls each numbered 0 to 9 (for the second an third digits of
the asking price). Thus any figure between 000 and 299 had equal probability to be drawn.
17 In this way all subjects had to come back for payment, whether this was “immediate” or delayed of one
or two months. This way possible confounds due to the “hassle”'of coming back only in case of either one or
two month delay were removed.6
Agreement in the first round entailed payment on the following day; agreement in the second
round entailed payment with one month delay, whereas failure to reach agreement resulted in no
subject receiving any payment.
On remark which is important at this point is that in experimental test involving delayed
monetary payments the issue of credibility arises. In the experiment of this paper, however, I do
not think this aspect was particularly relevant. The trustworthiness of the enterprise was
corroborated by the involvement of a senior member of faculty there, who took part in the
recruitment of the subjects. The reliability aspects concerning the practicalities as to payment was
ensured by telling subjects that for the “immediate” payment (i.e. “tomorrow”) I would have been
available on campus for the whole of the next day. For the “delayed payment” (one and two
month, depending on the version extracted) separate envelopes containing cash would have been
sent by courier on the specified date to the Students office on Campus - which is very small -
where subjects could then collect them. Anonymity was preserved throughout by assigning a
random “Personal Identification Code” to each student, who would have to present it in order to
collect his/her payment.
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  Fixed cost of delay (FXD) and proportional cost of delay (DSC) Fixed cost of delay (FXD) and proportional cost of delay (DSC) Fixed cost of delay (FXD) and proportional cost of delay (DSC) Fixed cost of delay (FXD) and proportional cost of delay (DSC)
In both these treatments the task consisted of the bargaining phase only. As in the BDM
treatment, 40 subjects were randomly assigned one role (either Bargaining East or Bargainer West)
and seated in two different rooms. The bargaining forms used were similar to the one for the BDM
treatment, with the idea to replicate in each of the 20 bargaining pairs the costs elicited in stage 1
of the BDM treatment. The way these costs were modelled was however different.
The FXD treatment was based on a fixed cost of delay: agreement in the second round of
negotiations resulted in the payment of a fixed fee out of the agreed share. In the FXD treatment a
“no bakrupcy rule” established that any agreement in the second round would have to be such that
shares were enough to cover both agent’s fees in order not to be void (thus resulting in no payment
at all). For each bargainer this fee corresponded to each of the one month limit prices observed in
the BDM treatment, and bargainers were matched so that each pair of negotiators in the FXD
treatment “mirrored” exactly one bargaining pair in the BDM treatment. Similarly, in the DSC
treatment subjects had to divide between them 300 chips, worth initially one monetary unit each.
If agreement was reached in the second round, the value of each chip would diminish of some
amount, which was determined so as to correspond to the pair of limit prices of each bargaining
pair in the BDM session (see section 5.3 below for the details).
In both FXD and DSC the bargaining forms reported the cost for delayed agreement (fixed or
proportional) to both players. Subjects were paid at the end of the experiment.7
3 3 3 3  Overview of the results Overview of the results Overview of the results Overview of the results
18 18 18 18
The first thing to observe is that overall subjects displayed sensitivity to the timing of a
monetary reward for the time frame chosen
19. Specifically, the amount of money subjects were
prepared to pay in order to avoid a one month delay in payment was statistically greater than
zero. Furthermore, for 23 out of 40 subjects the limit price increased in the “two months” version,
and the two observed median of the limit price distributions (10 and 35 monetary units for the
“one month” and “two month” versions, respectively) were statistically significant (the Wilcoxon
signed rank statistics is -3.182 for a test of equality of medians in the two distributions).
The next question to ask is whether this time sensitivity is carried to the bargaining phase.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see which model (fixed or proportional cost of delay) best
mimics bargaining over time.
To start with, consider treatment effects on bargaining behaviour
20. First of all, there appears to
be no significant difference in location between the various treatments: the unbiased estimate
21 of
the (true) difference in the median offer (or claim) across any two treatments is zero, and both the
Wilcoxon and the Robust rank order statistics applied to the various pairs of offers show no
statistically significant differences in the medians (see appendix ). However, a simple visual
inspection of the data suggests that the distribution of claims/offers are different in the three
treatments.
Tests for the equality of variance seem to suggest that the variance in the distribution of
claims/offers in both the DSC and FXD treatments is higher than in BDM (the Ansari-Bradley
statistics are 1.491849 for a test of FXD/BDM=1 against the alternative FXD/BDM>1 and 1.69973
for a test of DSC/BDM=1 against the alternative DSC/BDM>1, with p-values of .07 and .05,
respectively).
More interestingly, the distribution of claims for both DSC and FXD is asymmetric around the
median, unlike the one for BDM. That is, in both DSC and FXD the distribution of claims is
skewed to the right, revealing a more aggressive behaviour of first movers in this case
22.
                                       
18 Here I report only part of the statistical tests. The full set of results is in sections 4 and 5, with further
details contained in the appendices.
19 In pilot experiments I tried a shorther time horizon, setting X=1 week and X=2 weeks. In this case
only a very small subset of the subjects displayed any sensitivity at all to time. However, those who did had
marked differences in costs between one and two weeks delay.
20 The frequencies for offers of Bargainer East can be found in tables and figures in section 5 below.
21 I use 
^   = med(Xi- Yj) as an unbiased estimate of the shift parameter  in G(x)=F(x-), where F and G
represent the response distributions of subjects in two different treatments. Note that the Wilcoxon test for
instance would test the null hypothesis F=G against the alternative that one distribution stochastically
dominates the other. The estimator 
^    is median unbiased (i.e. E(
^   )=, and 
^    is distributed symmetrically
around , which is the median of the distribution of 
^ . . See Lehmann (1975), chapter 2.
22 Randles et al. (1981)’s test statistic for distributional symmetry, returns 2.330609 for FXD and
3.047766 for DSC, while only .3409593 for BDM. The statistic is distributed as a standard normal under the
null hypothesis of symmetric distribution, so that for both FXD and DSC the test rejects the null hypothesis8
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Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 1 1 1 1:  :  :  : Distribution of Bargainer East’s opening claim across treatments
In addition to this, in both DSC and FXD Bargainer East’s claim is significantly positively
correlated with his opponent’s limit price, a result which survives even if the observation relative
to the outlier (limit price of 299 for Bargainer West) is removed: Kendall’s  test for all
observations yields a correlation coefficient between East’s claim and West’s limit price of .446 for
FXD (significant at .006, one tailed) and of .463 for DSC (significant at .004, one tailed), whereas
for BDM the correlation coefficient is much lower (.154) and anyway not statistically significant.
The correlation between East’s claim and the limit price differential (limit price of bargainer East-
limit price of bargainer West) is even stronger (though this time is negative, obviously) for both
DSC and FXD, whereas once again in the BDM treatment this correlation is low and not
significant
23.
All these results taken together support the hypothesis of lack of time prominence: although
bargainers do prefer their monetary rewards sooner rather than later in an exercise which involves
merely time considerations, embedding the possibility of delayed agreement in a bargaining setup
completely focuses attention away from the potential cost of delay: subjects in the BDM
experiment seem to discard completely their opponent’s cost for time. In this treatment two norms,
the equal split and the 2/3-1/3 split work as very powerful attractors.
On the other hand, when the bargaining framework is completely devoid of time considerations,
and the penalty for delayed agreement is directly monetary in nature, subjects do react to the cost
of delay, and try to tailor (at least to some extent) their actions to the financial (opportunity) cost
of the responder. In this case the claim of first movers is positively correlated to the responders
                                                                                                                              
of symmetry against the one sided alternative of right-skewedness at 1% significance (see Hollander and
Wolfe (1999), comment 61). Details of this test are in appendix A.2.3.
23 All these results are detailed in section 5 and in the appendices.9
cost of rejection, and even more to the differential between own and opponent’s cost.  For both
these treatments (FXD and DSC), as we know from plenty of experimental evidence (see Roth,
1995), s.p.e. opening claims are hardly observed in practice. However, the conjecture (see Davis
and Holt (1993), chapter 5) that in two round bargains subjects’ opening claims are smaller  than
the s.p.e. prediction when the latter is sufficiently high (around at least 80% of the available
surplus), and  closer to the s.p.e. when the latter is more “reasonable” (around 50-75%) is partly
contradicted here. As can be seen in the figures below, while it is true that for the highest s.p.e.
claims (2 cases in the FXD treatment and one case in the DSC case) observed claims show more
restraint, in all other cases the observed claim exceeds by far the s.p.e. prediction.
FIXED: East's s.p.e. claim








































DISCOUNT: East's s.p.e. claim











































What about rejected offers? In the BDM treatment the same pattern observed in the first round
is repeated, with a concentration of offers on the two norms. Incidentally, these counteroffers are
not always accepted; indeed the BDM treatment was the most fractious, and agents seemed to
resent what they perceived as “low” offers, as time cost were not taken into account.
For both the other treatments (FXD and DSC) it is possible to compute the subgame perfect
equilibrium claims in the second round (off the equilibrium path; see section 5 below). In both
FXD and DSC responders move boldly away from the equal division (which is never offered) and
embrace a 2/3-1/3 convention.
The results are analysed in detail in the following sections.
4 4 4 4  Time preferences Time preferences Time preferences Time preferences
Subject’s evaluation of time was elicited by means of a modified BDM procedure as described
above (see instructions in the appendix).
Figures 1 and 2 report the scatterplot for one month and two months limit prices.10
One month






















Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 2 2 2 2:       limit prices for all observations
In Figure 2, which refers to all data collected, it can readily be seen that for two individuals
preference reversal occurred (points lying below the diagonal). These have been removed from
Figure 3, where it is easier to see how prices vary.
One month






















Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 3 3 3 3:  :  :  : Limit prices with exclusion of cases with preference reversal11
Although most observations are concentrated around the bottom left corner of the scatter,
subjects exhibit a pronounced variability in their time preferences. This can be seen more readily
from Figure 4.
Change in limit prices















Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 4 4 4 4:  :  :  : Qualitative changes in limit prices (two months-one month). Negative, positive and no change are
indicated with -, + and =, respectively. The column denoted by =(0) refers to limit prices which were zero
and did not change over time; the column denoted by =(1) refers to limit prices which were only equal to 1,
and did not change over time.
For 6 individuals preferences appear to be insensitive to the time horizon chosen (i.e. their limit
price is always zero); further 9 of them are sensitive to the first delay (i.e. one month), but not to
the second (i.e., the difference between two months and one month limit price is zero). However,
for 23 subjects the limit price increased (from a positive value) between one and two month. The
dispersion of the data can be visualised with the aid of Figure 5. Descriptive statistics are reported
in the table below.
One month One month One month One month Two months Two months Two months Two months
N N N N4 0 4 0
Mean Mean Mean Mean 32.88 50.88
Median Median Median Median 10.00 35.00
Mode Mode Mode Mode 0 0, 50
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 55.82 61.39
Minimum Minimum Minimum Minimum 0 0
Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum 299 299
Percentiles Percentiles Percentiles Percentiles 25 25 25 25 .25 3.25
50 50 50 50 10.00 35.00
75 75 75 75 50.00 90.00
Table  Table  Table  Table 1 1 1 1: : : : Descriptive statistics for observed limit prices12






















Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 5 5 5 5:  :  :  : limit price distributions (the thick line represent the median)
A Wilcoxon test performed on the data is consistent with the hypothesis that the two month
(TM) limit price distribution first order stochastically dominates the one month (OM)'limit price
distribution, that is, TM has a statistically significant higher median than OM. Note that this
effect is enhanced if we exclude from the analysis the cases which exibhited preference reversal
(indicated in parenthesis in Table 2).
N N N N Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks
Negative Ranks Negative Ranks Negative Ranks Negative Ranks
 a  a  a  a 2 (0) 22.25 (0) 44.50 (0)
Positive Ranks Positive Ranks Positive Ranks Positive Ranks
 b  b  b  b 23 12.20 (12) 280.50 (276)
Ties Ties Ties Ties
 c  c  c  c 15 TM-OM TM-OM TM-OM TM-OM
Total Total Total Total 40 (38)
a two months< one month; 
b  two months> one month; 
c two months = one month
Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics
 a, b  a, b  a, b  a, b
TM-OM TM-OM TM-OM TM-OM
Z Z Z Z -3.182 (-4.209)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 (.000)
a  Based on negative ranks
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table  Table  Table  Table 2 2 2 2: : : : Test for equality of medians between one month and two month limit prices.
All in all, then, the results above support the hypothesis that subjects were sensitive to the time
frame chosen.13
5 5 5 5  Bargaining behaviour Bargaining behaviour Bargaining behaviour Bargaining behaviour
As a preliminary, note that in the three types of bargain the subgame perfect equilibrium
(henceforth s.p.e.) offers  differ. Assuming linear utility for money, in the DSC treatment, solving
backwards, if the game were to reach the second stage, Bargainer West (player 2) would claim the
whole surplus, i.e. all of the 300 chips bargained over. Letting δ W denote the amount that each chip
is worth to him in the second round, the most bargainer East (player 1) can claim in the first
round is 300-300δ W =(1-δ W) 300.
On the other hand, in the FXD treatment in second round player West has to ensure that
player 1 receives an amount sufficient to cover his second period tax, as because of the “no-
bankruptcy constraint”'any agreement which failed to cover both player’s cost would be void.
Additionally, bargainer West would have to cover his own fee, too. Consequently, West’s payoff in
the second round would be 300-LPE—LPW, which then is what player East would have to concede in
the first round, retaining for himself LPE+LPW.
Thus the main difference between the s.p.e. first offers in the DSC and FXD treatment is that
under DSC the discount treatment first offers depend only on the responder’s cost of delay,
whereas in the FXD case equilibrium first offers depend on both player’s cost of delay.
Proportional costs of delay (discount factors) in the DSC treatment were constructed quite





= δ , where LPiBDM is the limit price of the “mirror” bargainer West in the BDM
treatment. This way of deriving discount factors may under-estimate the corresponding actual
discount factors for the subject in the BDM treatment, especially if the utility function is not linear
in money. However the only purpose of proportional discounting in this paper is to evaluate
whether it constitutes the appropriate frame to describe the essential features of negotiations over
real time. What is crucial for my results is that both the “correct” discount factor underlying the
subjects’ preferences and my own crude representation of it are some function of the limit prices - a
mild requirement. This is enough to allow a correct interpretation of the various non-parametric
tests
24 my analysis relies on, for which the only relevant information is rank. Consequently, these
tests are invariant to any order preserving transformation of the variable of interest.











− = − 300
300
300
1 300 1 δ . The table below reports the figures used in this
conversion between limit prices and discount factors used in the experiment
25.
                                       
24 See also footnote 29 below.14
LP LP LP LPiBDM iBDM iBDM iBDM 0 1 9 10 12 13 20 30 40 45 50 60 100 101 102 150 299
δδδδ i iii 1 .99 .97 .97 .96 .96 .93 .90 .87 .85 .83 .80 .66 .66 .66 .50 0
Table  Table  Table  Table 3 3 3 3: : : : Conversion between elicited limit prices (LPiBDM) and discount factors (δ i). All numbers in
hundreds of ITL.
Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are described in the following table:
Fixed cost Fixed cost Fixed cost Fixed cost Proportional discounting Proportional discounting Proportional discounting Proportional discounting
(Proposal is an amount of money) (Proposal is an amount of chips)
Proposes () () W E W E LP LP LP LP + − + 300 ;  if
LPE+LPW≤ 300 ;
claims all surplus otherwise
() () ( ) W W W W LP LP − = − 300 ; 300 ; 300 1 δ δ
Accepts
E LP x ≥ 0 ≥ x
Bargainer Bargainer Bargainer Bargainer
East East East East
Rejects
E LP x < 0 < x
Proposes () E E LP LP − 300 ;  if LPE+LPW≤ 300 ;
claims all surplus otherwise
() 300 ; 0
Accepts () W E LP LP x + − ≥ 300 W W LP x − = ≥ 300 300 δ
Rejects () W E LP LP x + − < 300 W W LP x − = < 300 300 δ
Bargainer Bargainer Bargainer Bargainer
West West West West
Note that W’s s.p.e. payoff in the second round
(off the equilibrium path) is 300-LPW-LPE.
Table  Table  Table  Table 4 4 4 4: Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in FXD and DSC. . . .
In all cases East’s claims have wildly exceeded the s.p.e. predictions. Similarly for West’s claims
in the second round. Significantly, though, none of the second period offers were at the equal split
level. This seems to show that as long as some focal point/convention other than the equal split is
available it can be used to anchor and justify more aggressive behaviour.
These results are analysed in more detail below.
5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1  Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM) Elicited time preferences (BDM)
The frequencies are reported in Table 5, and visualised in Figure 6.  The first thing to observe is
that although the modal claim is 150, there is another “mass point” at 200. Furthermore, more
than 55% of the offers lie above the sample mode, as well as the sample median (which is 170).
                                                                                                                              
25 Because of roundings, in some cases the same discount factor may correspond to slightly different limit15
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent Percent Percent Percent Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent Percent
120 120 120 120 1 5.0 5.0
150 150 150 150 8 40.0 45.0
170 170 170 170 2 10.0 55.0
180 180 180 180 2 10.0 65.0
200 200 200 200 6 30.0 95.0
220 220 220 220 1 5.0 100.0
Total Total Total Total 20 100.0
Table  Table  Table  Table 5 5 5 5:  :  :  : Frequency distribution of Bargainer East’s claims
BDM: East’s claim for himself















So, it seems that as a heuristic subjects used the either a fifty-fifty or a 2/3-1/3 convention
26
(recall that the amount to be divided was 300 monetary units).
But which of these offers are accepted? Below is the distribution of successful and rejected
proposals. Not surprisingly, the highest offers get rejected.
                                                                                                                              
prices. However such discrepancies are so small that this does not constitute a problem for the analysis.
26 The choice of convention may depend on the opponent limit prices, however the evidence in this respect
is weak. Specifically, the average limit price for bargainer West is 36.83 in correspondence of the 200 mark,
and either 13.29 or 49 in correspondence of the 150 claim, depending on whether the observation related to
the only subject with limit price 299 is excluded or not from the analysis. So, while dropping the outlier
seems to suggest some rule of thumb for the choice of convention, there is not enough evidence to warrant
the deletion of this observation from the data-set. Furthermore, remember that at any rate there is no
evidence of correlation between opponents’ limit prices and own offers.16
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125 150 175 200
BDM: East's claim for himself BDM: East's claim for himself BDM: East's claim for himself BDM: East's claim for himself
A Wilcoxon test shows a clear difference in the medians of the two distributions.
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks
West’s West’s West’s West’s
response response response response N N N N Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Sum of Sum of Sum of Sum of
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks
A A A A 10 14.75 147.50
R R R R 10 6.25 62.50 East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
Total Total Total Total 20
Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics
(b) (b) (b) (b)
East’s claim for himself East’s claim for himself East’s claim for himself East’s claim for himself
Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U 7.500
Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W 62.500
Z Z Z Z -3.370
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .000
(a)
a Not corrected for ties.
b Grouping Variable: BDM: West's response
Table  Table  Table  Table 6 6 6 6: : : : Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
However, there is now a significant negative correlation of rejected offers with the rejector’s
limit price, as can be seen from the table below. This reinforces the conclusions drawn above that
limit prices are not taken into account in the bargaining phase of the BDM treatment: the17
responders with the higher limit prices seem oblivious of their “condition” and reject also pretty
“central” offers, as visualised in the figure above.
Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for
bargainer bargainer bargainer bargainer
west west west west
Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for
bargainer bargainer bargainer bargainer
East East East East
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e.
East-West) East-West) East-West) East-West)
Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. . 287 -.036 -.246
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) . 154 . 453 . 186 A A A A
N N N N 10 10 10
Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. Cor. Coeff. .479(*) .479(*) .479(*) .479(*) -.117 -.495(*) -.495(*) -.495(*) -.495(*)
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .040 .040 .040 .040 .337 .033 .033 .033 .033
East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
R R R R
N N N N 10 10 10
** Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
Table  Table  Table  Table 7 7 7 7:  :  :  : Correlations based on Kendall’s τ  test - accepted vs. rejected offers
As one would expect, all the counteroffers in the second round yield bargainer East less than his
initial claim. Furthermore, indifference to the opponent’s limit prices persists, and similarly to
East’s claims in the second round, West’s offers turn out to be uncorrelated with the opponent’s
limit prices:
Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for
bargainer west bargainer west bargainer west bargainer west
Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for Limit price for
bargainer East bargainer East bargainer East bargainer East
Limit price differential Limit price differential Limit price differential Limit price differential
(i.e. East-West) (i.e. East-West) (i.e. East-West) (i.e. East-West)
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .191 -.113 -.187
sig. (1-tailed) sig. (1-tailed) sig. (1-tailed) sig. (1-tailed) .245 .343 .246
West’s West’s West’s West’s
offer in the offer in the offer in the offer in the
second second second second
round round round round N N N N 10 10 10
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
Table  Table  Table  Table 8 8 8 8: Correlations based on Kendall’s τ  test - counteroffers
But perhaps the most striking feature is that counteroffers in the second round did give the
proposer more than the rejected offer in terms of monetary payoff, but a smaller “utility”once the
limit price is taken into account. This is visualised in the figure below, which represents the
differences between the own claim and the rejected offer in the previous period. While all monetary
differences are strictly positive and of considerable value, once the cost of waiting is taken into
account 50% of these differences become either zero or negative (and considerably so).18
BDM - second round proposals

































Change net of cost
Nominal change
Interestingly, this happens quite independently of the rejector’s limit price:
BDM - second round proposals
(own claim - rejected offer)
































Change net of cost
Nominal change
Furthermore, it is evident a predilection for two norms, the fifty-fifty split and the 2/3-1/3
division, as from the picture below:19
BDM: West’s offer in the second round













Of all treatments, this was the most fractious: 50% of first offers were initially rejected, and
three of the negotiations ended with no agreement, with both bargainers obtaining a null payoff.
These results suggest that, although subjects did show a sensitivity to time (i.e. when
confronted with a task which involves purely time, subjects do notice), when the principal task is
such that time is only one of the relevant features involved, it seems not to matter. There is not a
great deal of dispersion in the initial offers (as compared to the other treatments, as we will see
below), which are uncorrelated to limit prices, and agents concentrate their proposals around two
conventions, 50/50 and 2/3-1/3.
The rejected offers are indeed correlated with respondent’s limit prices: however, the fact that
they are rejected shows that responders do not recognise the role of time. This is further reinforced
by two facts:
•   counteroffers follow a similar pattern to those of first movers: proposals are uncorrelated
with limit prices, are not very dispersed and concentrate around the two conventions.
•   In monetary terms counteroffer are advantageous to bargainer West; however, they
become negative if limit prices are taken into account.
5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2  Fixed cost of rejection (FXD) Fixed cost of rejection (FXD) Fixed cost of rejection (FXD) Fixed cost of rejection (FXD)
In this treatment the mode and median for the distribution of bargainer East’s claim coincide at
150 (i.e. equal split). However, while the average for the first half of the cases is 145, the average
for the second half is much higher at 178.20
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent Percent Percent Percent Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent Percent
140 140 140 140 2 10.0 10.0
150 150 150 150 8 40.0 50.0
160 160 160 160 3 15.0 65.0
170 170 170 170 1 5.0 70.0
180 180 180 180 3 15.0 85.0
190 190 190 190 1 5.0 90.0
200 200 200 200 2 10.0 100.0
Total Total Total Total 20 100.0
Table  Table  Table  Table 9 9 9 9:  :  :  : Frequency distribution of Bargainer East’s claims
Moreover, this distribution has a narrower support than that for the BDM, as depicted in the
figure below:
FIXED: East’s claim for himself














The first thing to note is that, as in the BDM treatment, a considerable proportion (40%) of the
claims are at the equal split division; however, although 50% of the claims are in excess of the
equal split, the second convention observed in the BDM treatment (i.e. the 2/3-1/3 partition) is no
longer focal.
This comes as no surprise once the relationship with the opponent’s cost of rejection is
inspected: as observed in section 7, opening offers are significantly positively correlated to
responder’s cost of rejecting an offer, and a nonparametric test of distributional symmetry shows
that both distributions (East’s claims and West’s cost of rejection) are skewed to the right
27.
Consider now rejections. As above, the highest offers end up being rejected, and there is a
significant difference in the medians of the accepted and rejected proposals.21
140 160 180 200

































A A A AR R R R
140 160 180 200
FIXED: East's claim for himself FIXED: East's claim for himself FIXED: East's claim for himself FIXED: East's claim for himself
Although less pronounced than in the BDM treatment, here as well there is a significant
difference between the median accepted and rejected proposals, as from the table below.
West’s response West’s response West’s response West’s response N N N N Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks
A A A A 13 8.58 111.50
R R R R 7 14.07 98.50 East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
Total Total Total Total 20
Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics
(b) (b) (b) (b)
East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U 20.500
Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W 111.500
Z Z Z Z -2.055
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .040
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed .046
(a)
a Not corrected for ties.
b Grouping Variable: FIXED: West’s response
Table  Table  Table  Table 10 10 10 10:       Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
Furthermore, only seven proposals (rather than 10 in the BDM treatment) are rejected.
Counteroffers appear to be rational insofar as they yield the first mover less than he originally
claimed for.
                                                                                                                              
27 See appendix A.2.3.22
FIXED - second round proposals
(own claim - rejected offer)
Case Number















Change net of cost
Nominal change
Moreover, only two out of the seven rejected offers yield a non-positive monetary payoff to the
proposers, and no bargain end in disagreement.
FIXED - second round proposals
(own claim - rejected offer)
Limit price for bargainer west















Change net of cost
Nominal change
The data show a less ‘recognisable’ pattern as compared to the BDM case, as shown in the
figure below. Responders seem very aware of the weakness which derives from their own cost of
delay, and apparently fail to realise that there is a role reversal. Incidentally, during post-
experimental debriefings, in the mains those subjects who were selected to be responders in the
first round (i.e. bargainers West) felt that they were at a disadvantage in negotiations because of
their role as responders.
This anxiety about own cost of disagreement tallies well with the experimental behaviour. As
mentioned above, proposers in the second round (bargainers West) consistently offered to their
opponent (bargainer East) less than what they had claimed in the previous round. The differential23
turns out to be significantly negatively correlated with bargainers West’s own cost of
disagreement
28, as reported in the table below:
Cost for  bar- Cost for  bar- Cost for  bar- Cost for  bar-
gainer West gainer West gainer West gainer West
Cost for bar- Cost for bar- Cost for bar- Cost for bar-
gainer East gainer East gainer East gainer East
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient -.685(*) -.685(*) -.685(*) -.685(*) -.065
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .020 .020 .020 .020 .429
Difference between West’s Difference between West’s Difference between West’s Difference between West’s
offer to East and East’s claim offer to East and East’s claim offer to East and East’s claim offer to East and East’s claim
in the previous round in the previous round in the previous round in the previous round
N N N N 7 7
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
Table  Table  Table  Table 11 11 11 11: Correlations based on Kendall’s τ  test
FIXED: West’s offer in the second round











Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 7 7 7 7
The analysis above seems to suggest that a fixed cost of disagreement is very clearly perceived
by the subjects: First movers’ offer are significantly negatively correlated with responders’ costs of
disagreement, and the correlation coefficient is high (in excess of .4 in absolute value). The effect of
costs of delay is significant in offers in the second round too. Only, in this case subjects perceive
their own cost as a source of reduced bargaining power, and their proposals are less aggressive the
higher their own cost of disagreement.
                                       
28 Recall that no such behaviour is observed in the BDM treatment.24
5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3  Discount Discount Discount Discount
The support of the distribution of initial claims (which is skewed to the right) in this treatment
is much larger than for the other two cases; as shown in appendix A.2.2 this distribution is more
dispersed than for the BDM treatment, whereas non statistically significant differences can be
detected with respect to the FXD treatment.
Although the equal split constitutes the modal claim (and accounts for 40% of the cases), both
the median and the average initial claims are higher, at 160 and 170, respectively. Moreover, 60%
of claims do not correspond to any established norm; once again, the key to explain this pattern of
offers is the positive correlation with the opponent’s cost of rejecting an offer (see appendix A.2.4).
The frequencies are reported in the table below, and represented in the picture below.
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent Percent Percent Percent Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent Percent
140 140 140 140 1 5.0 5.0
150 150 150 150 6 30.0 35.0
155 155 155 155 2 10.0 45.0
160 160 160 160 3 15.0 60.0
170 170 170 170 2 10.0 70.0
180 180 180 180 3 15.0 85.0
200 200 200 200 1 5.0 90.0
210 210 210 210 1 5.0 95.0
280 280 280 280 1 5.0 100.0
Total Total Total Total 20 100.0
Table  Table  Table  Table 12 12 12 12:       Frequency distribution of Bargainer East’s claims
DISCOUNT: East’s claim for himself













Consider now the responder’s behaviour. In this treatment the median of rejected offers is not
much higher than of the accepted ones, as shown in the picture below.
150 175 200 225 250 275

































A A A AR R R R
150 175 200 225 250 275
DISCOUNT: East’s claim for himself DISCOUNT: East’s claim for himself DISCOUNT: East’s claim for himself DISCOUNT: East’s claim for himself
A Mann-Withney test confirms indeed that the two medians do not differ statistically in a
significant way:
West’s response West’s response West’s response West’s response N N N N Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks
A A A A 13 10.12 131.50
R R R R 7 11.21 78.50 East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
Total Total Total Total 20
Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics
(b) (b) (b) (b)
East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim East’s claim
Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U Mann-Whitney U 40.500
Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W Wilcoxon W 131.500
Z Z Z Z -.403
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .687
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed
Sig.)] Sig.)] Sig.)] Sig.)] .699
(a)
a Not corrected for ties.
b Grouping Variable: DISCOUNT: West’s response (0=accept,
1=reject)
Table  Table  Table  Table 13 13 13 13:  Test for equality of medians between accepted and rejected offers in the first round.
Regarding counteroffers, they are “rational”, in the sense that they yield a discounted payoff
which is in excess of the rejected offer. Unlike the other two treatments, here payoffs in case of
agreement are (by construction) always non-negative.26
As in the FXD treatment (and to less extent in the BDM treatment), the 1/3-2/3 division seem
to attract most counteroffers, as the picture below shows:













Finally, as in all other treatments, bargainer West’s offer is uncorrelated to any of the limit
prices
29.
The analysis above seem to suggest that a discounted cost of disagreement is clearly perceived
by the subjects, which take it into account when making their offers. On the other hand,
responders are more aware of their own vulnerability in the first round due to their own cost of
disagreement. This effect persists in the second round, where counteroffers are negatively correlated
to their own cost of disagreement.
6 6 6 6  Discussion Discussion Discussion Discussion
One point that is worth stressing is that, regardless of the specific discount factors underlying
subjects’ preferences, the fact that delay is imposed in the same way in both stages of the BDM
treatment implies that there is no reason to expect a different evaluation of monetary outcomes in
the two phases as far as time attitudes are concerned
30. Thus, it seems reasonable to attribute any
differences in the attitude towards time to the superimposition of the bargaining structure.
The upshot of this analysis is therefore that even if subjects do show that they are sensitive to
the timing of a monetary reward, superimposing another task (bargaining) introduces a distractor
which focuses attention away from time considerations altogether.
                                       
29 Note that obviously, being Kendall’s τ  a non-parametric test, the result is invariant to considering the
discount factor rather than the limit price (in level). This is why in this analysis the precise way discount
factors are derived from limit prices is not crucial.
30 One possible exception could be wealth effects, as in the second stage the subjects were potentially
richer (because of the 300 monetary units gained in the first stage). However the “aggressiveness” of the
opening claims during bargaining may be evidence enough to show thus such wealth effects, if present, were
not too strong.27
This is all the more striking when one considers that the negotiations in which subjects were
involved were very stylised, and were still on monetary outcomes. On the other hand, when the
costs of disagreement are explicitly expressed in monetary terms, they do affect bargaining
behaviour.
Of course, these results do not have the pretense to undermine the vast and rich non-
cooperative bargaining theory based on time preferences
31, though they hint that there is room and
scope for reinterpretation of what ‘time preferences’ really mean in those models.
                                       
31 Nor would I want to, as most of my contributions are in this field!28
A A A A  Appendices Appendices Appendices Appendices
A.1 A.1 A.1 A.1  Limit prices Limit prices Limit prices Limit prices
A.1.1 A.1.1 A.1.1 A.1.1  Symmetry Symmetry Symmetry Symmetry
The test performed is based on Palomino et al. (1981). It consists in classifying all possible
subset of size three of observations coming from each sample as either right (if the average of
the observations is greater than the median) or left (if the reverse is true). The difference T
between the number of right and left triples is then found. An estimate of the variance, σ T is
then computed, and the statistic T/√ σ T is distributed as a standard normal under the null
hypothesis of symmetric distribution.
The results are reported below:
West West West West East East East East
T T T T 564 544
σσσσ T T T T 23216.52 25859.13
T/ T/ T/ T/√√√√ σσσσ T T T T 3.701524 3.382921
p. value (1 tailed) .000 .000
Table  Table  Table  Table 14 14 14 14: Test for distributional  symmetry.  Test for distributional  symmetry.  Test for distributional  symmetry.  Test for distributional  symmetry.
A.2 A.2 A.2 A.2  Comparison of Bargainer East’s claim in all treatments Comparison of Bargainer East’s claim in all treatments Comparison of Bargainer East’s claim in all treatments Comparison of Bargainer East’s claim in all treatments
A.2.1 A.2.1 A.2.1 A.2.1  Location Location Location Location
In the first instance a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was performed on the claims by
bargainers of type East (first movers) to check for a difference in medians. The results are
reported in the following table.
N N N N Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks Sum of Ranks
Negative Negative Negative Negative
ranks ranks ranks ranks 8
(a) 9.38 75.00
Positive Positive Positive Positive
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks 6
(b) 5.00 30.00
Ties Ties Ties Ties 6 (5)
(c)
FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM
Total Total Total Total 20 (19)
Negative Negative Negative Negative
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks 9
(d) 9.50 85.50
Positive Positive Positive Positive
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks 8 (7) 
(e) 8.44 (7.21) 67.50 (50.50)
Ties Ties Ties Ties 3 (3) 
(f)
DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM
Total Total Total Total 20 (19)29
Negative Negative Negative Negative
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks 6
(g) 7.67 46.00
Positive Positive Positive Positive
Ranks Ranks Ranks Ranks 8 (7) 
(h) 7.38 (6.43) 59.00 (45.00)
Ties Ties Ties Ties 6 (6) 
(i)
DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED
Total Total Total Total 20 (19)
Note: all variables refer to East’s claim for himself in the various treatments. Data in
parenthesis refer  to the case where outliers are included, which however does not affect the
calculations for the statistic
a FIXED< BDM;  
b FIXED > BDM; 
c BDM = FIXED
d DISCOUNT < BDM ; 
e DISCOUNT > BDM; 
f BDM = DISCOUNT
g DISCOUNT < FIXED; 
h DISCOUNT > FIXED; 
I FIXED = DISCOUNT
Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics Test Statistics
(c) (c) (c) (c)
FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM FIXED - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - BDM DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED DISCOUNT - FIXED
Z Z Z Z -1.420 
(a) -.428 (-.909) 
(a) -.411 (-.035) 
(b)
Asy. Sig. Asy. Sig. Asy. Sig. Asy. Sig.
(2-tailed) (2-tailed) (2-tailed) (2-tailed) .156 .669 (.363) .681 (.972)
a Based on positive ranks.
b Based on negative ranks.
c Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table  Table  Table  Table 15 15 15 15:  :  :  : Wilcoxon test for equality of medians in the distribution of East’s claim in all
treatments.
The Wilcoxon test however relies on the assumption that the observations come from the
same distribution, in particular assuming identity of variance. As - based on test which
follow in this appendices - equality of variance (and surely of distribution) is rejected, a
Robust Rank Order test (which is appropriate in this case) was performed. The statistic
32 is
calculated as
Ù () 1 , 0 ~
) ( ) ( 2
) ( ) (
N
YX U XY U V V
XY nU YX mU asy
Y X + +
−
=
where U(YX) is the average of U(YXi), the number of observations in Y placed ranked below
each of the m observations Xi in X; VX is the sum of the squared deviations of U(YXi)
around the mean (and similarly for the symmetric variables).
U(FXD,BDM)=12 U(BDM,FXD)=8 VFXD=378 VBDM=819 Ù=1.1124
U(DSC,BDM)=10.65 U(BDM,DSC)=9.35 VDCS=456.55 VBDM=876.55 Ù=0.3434
U(DSC,FXD)=8.8 U(FXD,DSC)=10.9 VDSC=617 VFXD=701.7 Ù=-0.5581
                                       
32 32 32 32 Tabled values for this statistic can be found in Fligner et al (1981). The distribution of the
statistic under the null of no change in location approaches the standard normal distribution as the
sample sizes increase (as in the case for this paper). See for instance Siegel and Castellan (1988).30
Table  Table  Table  Table 16 16 16 16:  :  :  :  Robust Rank Order test for equality of medians in the distribution of East’s claim
in all treatments.
Finally, in support of the above note that the median unbiased estimate of the treatment
effect can be computed as 
^   = med(Xi- Yj)=0.
A.2.2 A.2.2 A.2.2 A.2.2  Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion
The results reported below are for the Ansari-Bradley test. Similar results are obtained
with other test (e.g Siegel-Tuckey) which assume equality of median in the underlying
populations.
BDM BDM BDM BDM FXD FXD FXD FXD
FXD FXD FXD FXD 1.491849 .
p. value (1 tailed) .07
DSC DSC DSC DSC 1.69973 0.6353
p. value (1 tailed) .05 .26
Each cell reports the value of the Ansari-Bradley statistic for the
test of H0: σ row/σ column =1 against the one sided alternative of HA:
σ row/σ column >1. The statistic is distributed as a standard normal
distribution under the null.
Table  Table  Table  Table 17 17 17 17:  :  :  :  Robust Rank Order test for equality of medians in the distribution of East’s claim
in all treatments.
A.2.3 A.2.3 A.2.3 A.2.3  Symmetry Symmetry Symmetry Symmetry
The tests are based on Palomino et al. (1981) (see appendix A.1.1).
BDM BDM BDM BDM FXD FXD FXD FXD DSC DSC DSC DSC
T T T T 68 322 511
σσσσ T T T T 39775.23 19088.55 28111.14
T/ T/ T/ T/√√√√ σσσσ T T T T .3409593 2.330609 3.047766
p. value (1 tailed) .36 .009 .001
Table  Table  Table  Table 18 18 18 18:       Test for distributional  symmetry - East’s claim in all treatments.31
A.2.4 A.2.4 A.2.4 A.2.4  Correlations Correlations Correlations Correlations
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
for bargainer for bargainer for bargainer for bargainer
west west west west
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
for bargainer for bargainer for bargainer for bargainer
East East East East
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e.
East-West) East-West) East-West) East-West)
Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates
corrsponding corrsponding corrsponding corrsponding
to West’s cost to West’s cost to West’s cost to West’s cost
Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates
corrsponding to corrsponding to corrsponding to corrsponding to
East’s cost East’s cost East’s cost East’s cost
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .157 -.074 -.210 -.164 .041
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .194 .347 .121 .184 .415 BDM BDM BDM BDM
N N N N 20 20 20 20 20
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .446(**) .446(**) .446(**) .446(**) -.059 -.402(*) -.402(*) -.402(*) -.402(*) -.441(**) -.441(**) -.441(**) -.441(**) .066
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .006 .006 .006 .006 .375 .011 .011 .011 .011 .007 .007 .007 .007 .361 FXD FXD FXD FXD
N N N N 20 20 20 20 20
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .463(**) .463(**) .463(**) .463(**) -.163 -.658(**) -.658(**) -.658(**) -.658(**) -.459(**) -.459(**) -.459(**) -.459(**) .160
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .004 .004 .004 .004 .184 .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .004 .004 .004 .192 DSC DSC DSC DSC
N N N N 20 20 20 20 20
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
Table  Table  Table  Table 19 19 19 19: Correlations based on Kendall’s τ  test - East’s offer in all treatments (all
observations)
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
for bargai- for bargai- for bargai- for bargai-
ner West ner West ner West ner West
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
for for for for
bargainer bargainer bargainer bargainer
East East East East
Limit price Limit price Limit price Limit price
differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e. differential (i.e.
East-West) East-West) East-West) East-West)
Discount rates corre- Discount rates corre- Discount rates corre- Discount rates corre-
sponding to West’s sponding to West’s sponding to West’s sponding to West’s
cost cost cost cost
Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates Discount rates
corresponding to corresponding to corresponding to corresponding to
East’s cost East’s cost East’s cost East’s cost
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .244 -.125 -.301 -.252 .090
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .097 .259 .052 .090 .323 BDM BDM BDM BDM
N N N N 19 19 19 19 19
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .546(**) .546(**) .546(**) .546(**) -.092 -.496(**) -.496(**) -.496(**) -.496(**) -.541(**) -.541(**) -.541(**) -.541(**) .101
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .001 .001 .001 .313 .003 .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002 .002 .298 FXD FXD FXD FXD
N N N N 19 19 19 19 19
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient .409(*) .409(*) .409(*) .409(*) -.097 -.628(**) -.628(**) -.628(**) -.628(**) -.404(*) -.404(*) -.404(*) -.404(*) .092
Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) Sig. (1-tailed) .012 .012 .012 .012 .301 .000 .000 .000 .000 .013 .013 .013 .013 .313 DSC DSC DSC DSC
N N N N 19 19 19 19 19
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
Table  Table  Table  Table 20 20 20 20: Correlations based on Kendall’s τ  test - East’s offer in all treatments (no outliers)32
B B B B  Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to Structure of the game in the three treatments (picture handed out to
subjects) subjects) subjects) subjects)




































bargaining ends in disagreement
payment
no payment
payment less fee for
delay















bargaining ends in disagreement
Each chip is
worth  £100 for
each bargainer
no payment
Each chip is worth:
   £YE for East
   £YW  for West
Structure of the bargain: DSC35
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